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Abstract
Since the early 1970s when crude oil became Nigeria’s 
main source of foreign exchange, it soon joined the 
league table of rentier states. However, beginning from 
the second half of the 1990s to date, the Niger Delta, the 
heartbeat and the engine that drives Nigeria’s economy 
has being stormed by large scale tsunamis of unimaginable 
proportion due to militant activities. Consequently, 
Nigeria’s quest for unity, stability, national security and 
accelerated economic development are being undermined. 
This article explores the relevance of the rentier state 
theory and the resource-Curse thesis to explaining essence 
of the renewed violence in the Niger Delta. The article 
concludes that, although the basic assumptions of the 
rentier state theory and resource-curse thesis are relevant, 
there are other salient factors that are also paramount. 
Key words: Rentier state; Resource curse; Oil 
resource; Violent conflict; Niger  delta
Résumé 
Depuis le début des années 1970 lorsque le pétrole brut 
est devenu la principale source du Nigeria de change 
constants, il est bientôt rejoint le tableau de la ligue des 
Etats rentiers. Cependant, à partir de la seconde moitié 
des années 1990 à ce jour, le delta du Niger, le battement 
de coeur et le moteur de l'économie du Nigeria a été pris 
d'assaut par les tsunamis à grande échelle de proportion 
inimaginable en raison des activités militantes. Par 
conséquent, la quête du Nigeria pour l'unité, la stabilité, 
la sécurité nationale et d'accélérer le développement 
économique sont compromis. Cet article explore la 
pertinence de la théorie de l'état de rentiers et de la thèse 
malédiction des ressources pour expliquer l'essence de 
la violence renouvelée dans le delta du Niger. L'article 
conclut que, bien que les hypothèses de base de la théorie 
de l'état de rentiers et de la malédiction des ressources 
thèse sont pertinentes, il ya d'autres facteurs importants 
qui sont également primordiaux. 
Mots clés: Etat rentier; Malédiction des ressources; 
Les ressources pétrolières; Les conflits violents; Le delta 
du Niger
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INTRODUCTION
Oil in commercial quantity was discovered in Nigeria in 
1956, and has since the 1970s become the mainstay of 
the national economy. In the past five decades, absolute 
oil production as well as the dependence of the country 
on the oil exports has therefore increased significantly. 
For instance, as at 2006, Nigeria’s petroleum exports as 
percentage of total national exports was 98 percent (UNDP, 
2008). Significantly therefore, Nigeria’s dependence on 
oil, “measured by oil exports as a percentage of total 
national exports or by oil rents as a percentage of overall 
government revenue, is even higher than, for example, 
that of petrostate Venezuela” (Mähler, 2010, 14). The 
implication of Nigeria’s dependence on oil as its main 
source of revenue has been the vulnerability of its 
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economy to the volatility of the global oil price. Similarly, 
according to Mogues (2008,9), since oil became the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy, “agricultural products 
which used to be the backbone of the Nigerian economy, 
and which constituted approximately 80 percent of total 
national exports in 1960, had by 1976 declined to only 4 
percent”.
Given the above, from a position of relative obscurity, 
oil became the central factor in Nigeria’s political 
economy. To be more specific, since 2008, Nigeria 
became one of the largest oil producers in the world, and 
considering its low internal consumption, the eight largest 
oil exporters in the world (Bfai, 2008). However, even 
though Nigeria is richly endowed with both renewable and 
non-renewable oil resources that are predominantly found 
in the Niger Delta areas, paradoxically, the Niger Delta 
remain the poorest region, due largely to the ecologically 
unfriendly exploitation of oil and the politics of oil. 
For instance, as Mukwaya (2005: 127-134) observed, 
“the ecological devastation caused by oil production 
has rendered the main occupation of the people, which 
previously was farming and fishing useless”. Thus, “the 
people of the Niger Delta are deprived of their fair share 
of the wealth on which the entire Nigerian federation 
depends; they benefit only from compensation for 
incidents of oil pollution”.
In view of the effects of environmental degradation, 
and unfavourable oil politics, since the second half of the 
1990s to date, Nigeria has being witnessing uprisings, 
and recently graduating to armed violence targeted at 
the Federal Government and oil-producing companies 
(Omotola, 2010). Unlike the Ken Saro Wiwa-led uprising 
that was limited to the Ogoniland, the recent armed 
violence in the Niger Delta involves several communities, 
and has also been more of armed struggle than peaceful 
protests. The Nigerian Government on realising that the 
escalation of the violence portends danger to the unity, 
national security and development of Nigeria, has since 
2008 embarked on the Niger Delta Amnesty initiative 
(Asuni, 2009). At this stage, while it may be too early to 
judge the effectiveness of the Amnesty initiative, suffice 
to say that, Nigeria is still witnessing militarised unrests 
and agitations for autonomy from the very region that 
produces 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. 
Thus, given the ferocious nature of the uprisings, some 
people have commented that the militant activities in the 
Niger Delta is one of the greatest challenges Nigeria will 
be facing in the twenty-first century. 
Employing the rentier state theory and the resource-
Curse thesis as framework of analysis, this article 
explored the essence of the renewed violence in the Niger 
Delta and hopes to conclude that, even though the rentier 
state theory and resource-curse thesis are relevant to 
explaining what is described as the immediate or initial 
motives of violence, other remote and prevailing factors in 
the Nigerian environment are also significant. Building on 
the above observation therefore, it is advanced here that, 
the negative impacts of the immediate and remote factors 
among others are what combined to escalate the violence 
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
1.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE RENTIER 
STATE THEORY AND THE RESOURCE 
CURSE THESIS
There has been a growing interest in the study of natural 
resources and their diverse international and domestic 
impacts on countries in the recent years. Although partly 
divergent in their main assumptions, in the opinion of 
Mähler (2010: 7), “the rentier state theory and the resource 
curse thesis are the two central theoretical approaches that 
focus on the topic of resource abundance…” Embedded in 
the assumption of both the rentier state theory and the re 
resource-curse is that, “developments in resource exporting 
countries are negatively affected by socio-political and 
economic distortions”. The main assumptions of these two 
theoretical approaches are explained in turn as follows. 
The concept of the rentier state was first mentioned 
in the study of patterns and problems of economic 
development in pre-revolutionary Iran by Hossein 
Mahdavi in 1970. It was expanded to cover more States 
in the Arab world, and popularised by Hazem Beblawi 
and Giovanni Luciani in 1987. It was thus, these scholars 
that specifically gave the rentier state its popularity and 
clarity. In the study of these scholars, a rentier state was 
considered to be that which at least 40 percent of the 
total government revenue consists of economic rents 
(Beblawi and Luciani, 1977). The rent mentioned above 
is defined by Dunning (2008,39) as “the excess over the 
return to capital, land, and labour when these factors 
of production are put to their next best use”. According 
to the rentier state theory, “the two central effects of 
dependence on economic rents are economic inefficiency 
and, as a consequence, the obstruction of socioeconomic 
development” (Beck, 2007: 46). With regard to the 
political effects, the rentier state theory proposes that 
(oil) rents have a stabilizing effect on authoritarian rule 
(Mahdavi, 1971; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987 and Ross, 
2001).
Although, the rentier state theory was initially based 
on empirical findings in the Middle East, Beck (2007:44) 
notes, “its proponents claimed, it is universally valid”. 
Essentially, the rentier state theory attributes connection 
of oil rents and authoritarianism to the following factors: 
Firstly, it is presumed that oil rents foster the formation of 
stabilizing patronage networks, widespread clientelism, 
and assistentialistic distribution policies, all of which 
lessen the pressure from the population to democratize 
and may additionally result in the de-politicisation of the 
society. Secondly, the abundance of revenues generated 
by the oil sector means that national rulers do note need 
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to tax the population. This again may disburden the 
political elite of demands from the population for political 
participation and accountability on the part of the elites 
(Mähler, 2010).
From the foregoing, it is observable that, the rentier 
state theory does not focus primarily on violence, but 
rather on the stability of authoritarian rule. However, 
recent studies illustrate that, resource wealth makes it 
easier for authoritarian rulers to use violence in the form 
of political repression, for example, because it enables the 
financing of a massive security apparatus (Ross, 2001 and 
Karl, 2007). On the basis of the above argument, one can 
deduce that, given the percentage of what Nigeria spend 
from its annual budget to secure the support of indigenous 
chiefs and elites, as well as to maintain law and order in 
the Niger Delta, especially as a result of recently renewed 
armed militancy, it becomes evident that, there is to 
some extent, a connection between oil abundance and 
authoritarianism, and hence, the relevance of the rentier 
theory to explaining the essence of the violent conflicts in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
The resource-curse thesis on the other hand, is another 
theoretical approach that has gained importance within 
the natural resource-conflict theoretical debate. There are 
two schools of thought within the resource-curse debate. 
The first school of thought consists of those scholars who 
place special emphasis on the economic characteristics 
of resource-rich countries. That is, building upon the 
basic assumptions of rentier state theory, they claim that 
resource wealth is connected to poor economic growth 
and other economic problems such as Dutch disease 
effects and poor performance of the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors accompanied by an insufficient 
degree of diversification and extreme vulnerability 
towards external shocks. The scholars that belong to the 
first line of the resource-curse debate include Auty (1993) 
and Sachs &Warner (2001) among others. 
The second school of thought on the other hand, 
consists of those scholars that focus on the connection 
between natural resources and violent conflicts. The 
central assumption of this school of thought, which to 
some extent contradicts the assumptions of the rentier 
state theory is that, resource dependent countries such as 
Nigeria, are more likely to experience internal instability 
and violent conflict than non-resource countries, The 
scholars that belong to the second line of the resource-
curse debate include Collier & Hoeffler (2001); Le Billon 
(2001) and De Soysa (2000) among others. 
In their various studies to establish connection 
between resource abundance and violence, the scholars 
of the second line of the resource-curse debate advanced 
two main arguments. First, parts of the population of a 
country such as the Niger Delta might feel that they are 
deprived of the financial benefits of the revenues derived 
from oil resource, and possibly also suffering from the 
ecological and social impacts of production. Similarly, 
resource wealth is considered the target of avaricious 
rebels who wish to take possession of the oil resource 
revenues (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). Secondly, revenues 
derived from a resource can serve as a catalyst for violent 
conflict as the rebel groups and other actors involved are 
able to use it to finance their rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). And similarly, abundant resources, especially oil, it 
is argued can indirectly increase the likelihood of violent 
conflict because, it weakens political institutions and/or 
trigger socio-economic decline. It is in the above vein for 
example, that Fearon & Latin (2003,81) observed that, 
“oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than 
one would expect given their level of income, because the 
rulers have less need of a socially intrusive and elaborate 
bureaucratic system to raise revenues”. 
The above are the main assumptions in the rentier state 
theory and resource-curse thesis. On face value, the utility 
of the two approaches appear valid. But recent literatures 
have not only questioned, but criticised the alleged 
connection between resource and violence. For example, 
recent studies identified countries such as Botswana, Chile 
and Norway among others with abundant resources, and 
yet are stable and economically prosperous democracies 
(Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 
2006 and Di John, 2007). To this end, some scholars 
have demanded a further theoretical differentiation of 
the debate and have suggested that the impact of certain 
conditions is imperative for the prevalence or absence of 
the so called resource-curse (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005; 
Boschini, Peterson & Jesper, 2004; Basedau, 2005 and 
Basedau & Lay, 2009). Furthermore, some scholars have 
even gone further to indicate the potential of external, 
social and historical forces in explaining the connections 
between resource and violence (Di John, 2007 and Rosser, 
2006).
Inspite of the criticisms of the rentier theory and 
resource-curse thesis, given the escalation of violence 
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, and need to get to the bottom 
of the conflicts that are threatening and or undermining 
the unity, national security and development of Nigeria, 
their utilities for area and comparative studies remains 
undoubtedly substantial. In this connection therefore, 
taking into consideration the embedded assumptions of 
the rentier state theory and the resource-curse thesis that 
are reviewed above, and which overly interpreted, appear 
to suggest potential connection between the oil resources 
and escalation of violence in the Niger Delta; analysis of 
the causal factors that explains the essence of the renewed 
violence in the Niger Delta becomes necessary. It is 
expected that after a critical analysis of the interplay of 
the causal factors, the selected approaches should throw 
some light on the essence of the violence in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta.
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2 .  E X P L A I N I N G  T H E  I M M E D I AT E 
ESSENCE OF VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA’S 
NIGER DELTA
Since oil was first discovered in Oloibiri, and subsequent 
production since the 1970s, it has being causing severe 
environmental damage in the Niger Delta. For instance, 
UNDP (2006,76) report noted that, “oil spills has led to 
the contamination of water resources, the destruction of 
farmland, and the dispersion of toxic materials”. Similarly, 
according to Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz (2007:9), 
“Nigeria is considered as one of the biggest gas flarers in 
the world”. Expectedly, this gas flaring “harms wildlife, 
farmland, and human beings through air pollution, acid 
rain, noise, and increase in temperature” (UNDP, 2006:78-
79). These environmental damages and associated 
grievances represent a permanent source of discontent 
and mistrust on the part of the Niger Delta’s population 
towards the government. It is for this reason that, Mähler 
(2010:16) noted that, “the discontent is most likely 
continuing to grow due to unfulfilled, yet longstanding 
promises of compensation”. 
The politics that surround revenue allocation is an 
important factor in the escalation of violence in the Delta. 
For instance, in a report by the UNDP (2006:16), the 
percentage of oil revenue allocation to the oil producing 
states “has declined from 50 percent in 1970 to 20 
percent between 1975 and 1979, and down to only 3 
percent between 1992 and 1999”. Under the civilian 
administration in the period 1999 and 2011, the percentage 
of oil revenue allocation to the oil producing states has 
been pegged at 13 percent. Given the unfavourable 
revenue allocation, the Delta states are angered that they 
are deprived by the central government that is dominated 
by a segment of the Nigerian ethnic group from benefiting 
a substantial income that are generated in their immediate 
environment. 
To make matter worse, the physical and social 
i n f r a s t ruc tu re s  i n  t he  N ige r  De l t a  a r e  h igh ly 
underdeveloped. For instance, according to IDEA 
(2001,254),  the Niger Delta is  characterised by 
“insufficient access to health care, potable drinking water, 
and electric power”. In addition, “the housing situation 
was once considered in comparative terms, generally 
worse than that in the rest part of the country”. 
An important structural problem of note that results 
from economic distortions in oil economies is widespread 
unemployment. The oil industry is generally very 
capital intensive but not labour intensive. In Nigeria, 
this structural problem is particularly pronounced, as 
crude oil is hardly processed within the country but 
rather immediately exported. For example, “Nigeria 
currently imports almost 85 percent of the refined oil 
products it uses” (EAI, 2009: 4). While the capacity of 
the four existing state-owned refineries is completely 
insufficient, so far “no private refinery exists in Nigeria” 
(Asuni, 2009,8). As at 2005, in a report by AI (2005,35), 
the entire oil industry in Nigeria “employed directly 
or indirectly only about 35,000 people”. Conversely, 
whereas the oil industry has already destroyed jobs in 
the agricultural sector as noted above, there have been 
no efficient counter-measures from the government. As a 
result, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment 
is extremely high in the Niger Delta, markedly higher than 
in the rest parts of the country (IDEA, 2001,254; UNDP, 
2006,131 and Aigbokhan, 2007,195).
By geographical characteristics, the Niger Delta is 
largely covered with marshes, forests and creeks. To 
Ukeje (2008,10), it is especially “for nonlocals a difficult 
to access territory and hence an excellent area for 
militants to train and retreat to once they have kidnapped 
a foreign oil worker or caused colossal damages to 
oil production infrastructures”. While probably not of 
superior importance in this argument, it nevertheless can 
be considered as one of the reasons for the prolongation 
of the conflicts between militant groups and the Nigerian 
government. Furthermore, the geographical characteristics 
of the Niger Delta make the area extremely vulnerable to 
oil spills and other collateral damage resulting from oil 
exploitation. For example, spilled oil is easily caught up in 
the stagnant water of the marshland and contaminates the 
drinking water. The Niger Delta people blame the mess on 
the environment on the carelessness of the oil producing 
companies and the attitude of the Nigerian government 
towards environmental protection.
For a long time, The Nigerian oil sector has been 
dominated by Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) 
such as Shell Petroleum Development Company, Exxon 
Mobil, Chevron, Total (Elf) and Eni/Agip among 
others. Despite the privatisation and commercialisation 
of the oil  industry occasioned by the Structural 
Adjustment Programme, Ukiwo (2008: 76) notes that, 
“private Nigerian oil companies only produce a small 
amount of oil”. Thus, in keeping with their operational 
characteristics, which among other are to make profit no 
matter the cost to the host environment, the multinational 
oil companies have influenced the essence of the violent 
conflicts in several ways. For example, the oil companies 
carry part of the blame for the environmental pollution 
caused by oil production. Nevertheless, the Nigerian 
government is to bear the entire blame for not ensuring 
compliance to standards that will ensure the protection 
of nature and human beings. Furthermore, The MNOCs 
have indirectly contributed to the increased militarisation 
of the conflicts and the garrisoning of the Niger Delta, 
by requesting the Nigerian government to provide 
security services, even when civil protests were still 
mainly peaceful (Omotola, 2006:16; Engel, 2005: 196). 
In addition, the oil companies also make use of private 
security services, whose notion about the Niger Delta 
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communities is that of saboteurs, terrorist and criminals, 
hence the orientation and approaches of the security 
services is brutality. Similarly, some oil companies have 
also “provided financial assistance to either potential 
militants or existing groups in order to pacify them” 
(ICG, 2006,24-25). While this in the short term might 
reduce violence, on the long run, in the opinion of Hazen 
& Horner (2007,38), “it is obvious that the MNOCs risks 
further, the empowerment of potential or existing militant 
groups”.
Another factor that clearly contributes to the increase 
and especially the continuation of violent conflict in the 
Niger Delta in recent years is “the illegal oil trade, which 
has increased drastically since 2000” (HRW, 2003,9). 
The illegally bunkered oil is shipped to refineries in Ivory 
Coast, Senegal and Benin or directly sold to the broader 
international market, mostly to Eastern Europe. The actors 
that are involved in this oil bunkering include the militant 
groups, who are paid ransom either in cash or in kind. 
Other actors that are also involved include the security 
forces, especially the Nigerian navy; local and regional 
politicians; and other powerful actors such as godfathers 
and international business people (AI, 2005,35; ICG, 
2006,9 and Bello, 2011,256-260). Because of the broad 
involvement of influential persons that are involved in the 
oil bunkering, the approach of the Nigerian government 
to solving the Niger Delta crisis has been marked by 
significant inconsistency, persistent reluctance and a lack 
of engagement.
Nigeria currently exports approximately 50 percent 
of its crude oil to the United States (EIU, 2009). On 
the other hand, “approximately 10 percent of the oil 
imports of the United States come from Nigeria” (Lubeck 
& Watts, 2007,4). Thus, since 1999 when Nigeria 
became a democracy, “the relationship between the two 
countries has been harmonious, and has been marked by 
a benevolent attitude towards Nigeria on the part of the 
United States” (Bergstresser & Tull, 2008,19). Because 
of the expanded oil trade between the two countries, the 
“United States has increased supply of its weapons to 
Nigeria, and has at the same time expanded its military 
presence in the Gulf of Guinea”, for example, via naval 
patrols (Hazen & Horner, 2007,101). In addition, in 
2005, the Nigeria and the United States announced a 
coordinated actions to “counter small arms trafficking, 
bolster maritime and coastal security, promote community 
development and combat poverty, and to fight money 
laundering and other financial crimes” (Lubeck, Watts 
& Lipschutz, 2007,19). Primarily because of its own 
economic interests (oil supply), and also because of 
strategic considerations with respect to the role of Nigeria 
as a regional power in West Africa, the United States is 
generally interested in reducing the internal instability in 
the country. Nevertheless, “the United States’ efforts to 
exert its influence on the violent conflict in the Niger Delta 
have at least to date, been of low success rate” (Lubeck & 
Watts, 2007,20). The implication of the US and Nigeria 
security operation is that, the Niger Delta communities 
see the joint security actions as a garrisoning agenda that 
denies them the fundamental right of movement in their 
own land.
What is clear from the foregoing analysis is that, the 
distortions caused by the development of oil economy 
are the central factors in the dissatisfaction of the Niger 
Delta population and the consequent armed struggle. In 
this connection, it also becomes clear to assume that the 
violence in the Niger Delta is connected to the oil resource 
and its production. By implication therefore, the rentier 
state theory and the resource-curse thesis to some extent 
are valid in explaining the essence of the violent conflicts 
in the Niger Delta. 
3.  EXPLAINING THE REMOTE ESSENCE 
OF VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA’S NIGER 
DELTA
The remote essences that are most notably triggering 
violence in the Niger Delta are two key cleavages 
between ethnic and religious identity groups. The first is 
a cleavage at the national level between north and south. 
For instance, to Brunner (2002,132), “the existing ethnic 
and religious differences between the north, dominated 
by the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani people and 
the mainly Christian, ethnically heterogeneous south 
that were exacerbated and politicised by the different 
forms of colonial rule”. What one can infer from the 
above is that, even before oil became the mainstay of the 
Nigerian economy, these differences had created a sharp 
internal division in the country. This difference is further 
heightened by the perception of political domination of 
the northern elites and their overwhelming influence on 
the central government over the southern population. 
Therefore, other than the oil factor, the mistrust and the 
lack of nationhood had endangered the internal stability of 
Nigeria.
The second cleavage, which is provoking violence in 
the Niger Delta even more directly are localized within the 
Niger Delta. Such cleavage for instance, is the ferocious 
and recurring interethnic and intercommunity conflicts. A 
central dimension of the interethnic and intercommunity 
conflicts has been minority ethnic groups’ concern about 
the dominance of the major groups. An example would be 
“the Ogoni people’s fear of Igbo dominance; an anxiety 
which goes back to colonial times” (Brunner, 2002, 252). 
The other central dimension of the conflicts is the struggle 
between the major ethnic group, the Ijaw, and other 
ethnic groups, especially the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Andoni, 
mostly “regarding the ownership of land and local power” 
(Ngomba-Roth, 2007, 145). While the ethnic cleavages in 
the Niger Delta are contributing considerably to violent 
conflict at the local level, it can on the other hand be 
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assumed that “these cleavages are one of the reasons for 
the absence of broader and harmonious actions against 
the Nigerian government and the oil companies” (Zinn, 
2005:107).
While the population density in Nigeria is generally 
quite high, the population density in the habitable parts 
of the Niger Delta is “even above the national average 
and it is persistently increasing” (UNDP 2006: 24). This 
high population density is causing land scarcity and can 
therefore be considered another factor fueling the internal 
tensions in a region that is ethnically very fragmented.
Loss of influence of family clans and traditional 
societal structures are further aspects that are contributing 
to the increase in Niger Delta violence. In the recent 
time, the social and political authority of local traditional 
rulers has significantly declined, partly because of 
changing patterns of society worldwide in the course 
of modernization and globalization, and partly also 
because of the fact that “the traditional rulers are viewed 
as collaborating with the oil companies and the political 
elite for their own personal benefit” (UNDP, 2006: 42). 
The consequence according to Obi (2006: 41-42) has 
been “a change in the principal actors of resistance and 
struggle in the Niger Delta, who are now younger, mostly 
male actors”. They are generally more prone to violence, 
especially given the high level of unemployment in 
the Delta and the fact that without the social support of 
traditional family structures, the young people are hit even 
harder by the endemic unemployment.
Nigeria is not only ethnically and religiously 
fragmented society,  but  is  also marked by “the 
fragmentation of its political structure”, something 
which results in the “persistent weakness of the political 
institutions” (Lewis, 2007: 282). Reinforced by the 
tri-regional colonial rule and the existing cultural 
fragmentation, the weakness of the political system 
was not completely remedied when Nigeria became 
independent in 1960. Hence, Brunner (2002: 132) has 
rightly observed that, the historically weak political 
institutions, which undermined the effectiveness of the 
political output has also “reduced Nigeria’s capacity to 
provide internal stability”. Furthermore, the rudimentary 
political institutions were further destroyed and 
delegitimized by the successive military regimes, which 
also reinforced identity politics and paternalistic political 
rule. The military dictators, especially, Babangida and 
Abacha used the oil revenue to co-opt the traditional 
rulers in order to bolster their political legitimacy, thereby 
fostering a prebendal and clientele culture in the Nigerian 
society.
Despite the institutional weakness, violent state 
repression under military rule was obviously “one of the 
factors limiting the occurrence of more violent protests 
and broader social conflicts in the Niger Delta until the 
end of the 1990s” (Hazen & Horner, 2007: 72). Brutal 
repression also helps to explain the relatively rapid 
abatement of the Ogoni protests in the middle of the 
1990s. Consequently, many studies emphasize that the 
escalation of violence in the Niger Delta occurred parallel 
to the process of democratization in the late 1990s (Hazem 
& Horner, 2007,10; World Bank, 2003: 225). 
Indeed, there have been two main mechanisms through 
which democratization has contributed to the escalation of 
violence in the Delta. First, since 1999 there has generally 
been less governmental repression, thereby increasing the 
opportunity for activists and militants to easily mobilize 
for protests and other kinds of violent struggles. Although 
violent, and sometimes excessively violent repression 
by security forces is still occurring in the Niger Delta, 
this repression is more selective and inconsistent for 
example, because of the collaboration of security forces 
with some of the activists and militants, because of the 
security forces’ themselves participation in the illegal oil 
and weapons trade, and because the security forces lack 
resources and skills to efficiently handle crisis. As a result, 
governmental repression, rather than curbing violence, is 
fostering counter-violence activities in the Niger Delta. 
Secondly, since 1999 when Nigeria returned to 
partisan democracy, politicians have on a large scale 
recruited mostly unemployed youths in the Niger Delta. 
These unemployed youths were “provided with weapons 
to protect themselves, to fight political opponents, and to 
intimidate potential voters to vote for the right candidate”. 
The weapons that were allocated to “these youths were 
for the most part never returned” (Hazem & Horner, 
2007: 13-14 and Human Rights Watch, 2004: 2) By 
implication, it means that, there are a considerable number 
of well-armed, disillusioned youths, many of whom were 
dismissed after the elections as the politicians no longer 
had any use for them. For example, the powerful militant 
leaders Ateke Tom (head of the Niger Delta Vigilante) and 
Alhaji Asari Dokubo (head of the Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteer Force) were according to Lubeck, Watts & 
Lippschutz (2007: 8) “actively deployed (and paid) by 
high ranking politicians to be political thugs during 
elections”. 
Due to the weakness of the political institutions, 
informal arrangements and particularly non-state actors 
have become “very important people” in the Nigerian 
politics. Special attentions in the context of the surge in 
electoral violence in Nigeria since 1999 should therefore 
also be directed at the so-called godfathers who are not 
democratically legitimate, but in practice, they exercise 
political influence in Nigeria because they are wealthy 
and socially powerful individuals. They support political 
candidates, frequently making use of violence, and in 
return demand to have control over political decisions 
and to receive personal benefits or political protection 
for their illegal activities. (Walker 2008). Godfatherism 
can be considered to be “both a symptom and a cause 
of the violence and corruption that together permeate 
the political process in Nigeria” and particularly in 
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the Niger Delta (HRW, 2007: 34). Within this vicious 
circle, godfatherism further reduces the legitimacy of 
government and perpetuates the political culture of 
irresponsible leadership.
The absence of a viable system of political parties 
is another symptom of the failure of the democratic 
political institutions in Nigeria. For example, most of 
the unambiguously formed political parties hardly have 
defined political manifestoes and ideology.  But rather, 
are formed to serve or facilitate corruption and patronage 
networks. To be more specific, PDP’s dominant control of 
the machinery of government at the centre and at the other 
tiers of government, by implication means, it has access to 
large public funds, which are used to buy political loyalty, 
to mobilize violence, and to enforce loyalty (Nwankwo, 
2003: 138; HRW, 2007: 36). This is not only further 
undermining the democratic legitimacy of the political 
elites but also directly contributing to the increase in 
violence in the Niger Delta. For example, according to 
Human Rights Watch (2007: 23), armed groups in Rivers 
state “openly acknowledged that they were sponsored by 
the PDP to rig the 2003 elections”. 
Furthermore, the political culture in Nigeria has 
also been negatively influenced by the many decades 
of repressive military rule. Consequently, Nigeria is 
marked not only by weak political institutions but also, 
in interaction with the latter, by a lack of responsible 
leadership, especially at the level of the state governors 
and the local political elites (Ologbenla: 2007). The 
negative political culture and lack of responsible 
leadership are evident in “the widespread tendency of 
elites to use public offices and political power to pursue 
private interests” (IDEA, 2001: 243). With the civilian 
democracy, this cupidity has become more publicly 
evident, and it is therefore increasingly causing anger 
within the Nigerian population. Although this aspect does 
not appear to be of primary relevance, it can be regarded 
as one of the factors indirectly responsible for the 
increased potential for conflict in recent years.
In a similar way, the escalation of violence in the 
Niger Delta is related to the military culture that is evident 
in the Niger Delta policy, which can to a large extent 
be classified as carrot and stick strategy. For instance, 
according to Hazen & Horner (2007: 96), the federal 
government’s strategies for the reduction of militancy 
in the Niger Delta are usually accompanied by “heavy-
handed military tactics”. The persistent military culture of 
“high-handedness are easily noticeable in the operational 
tactics of Nigerian security forces who for decades are 
being trained in authoritarian practices and therefore 
remain highly militarized” (Hazen & Horner, 2007: 102). 
For instance, according to various reports by the Human 
Right Watch, the Joint Task Force that is composed of 
the army and police, which have been stationed in the 
Niger Delta since 2003, is notorious for “its human rights 
violations, extrajudicial killings, looting and immoderate 
use of force” (See 1999a; 1999b; 2002 & 2006). The Odi 
massacre is a case in point where the Joint Task Force, in 
1999 under operation Hakuri II completely razed down 
the Odi town. Similarly, in February 2005, the Joint Task 
Force attacked “Odioma communities where they killed at 
least 17 people, and destroyed the whole the villages” (AI, 
2005: 19). 
Absence and or lack of physical and socio-economic 
infrastructures, have in the recent time, increased the 
frustration of the militants as well as the civil population 
of the Niger Delta. Especially for the younger generations, 
the lesson of the Ogoni protests in the middle of the 
1990s is that, peaceful protest does not produce any 
positive results. As Nigeria transited from military to 
partisan democracy, the Niger Delta communities had 
high expectations and hopes for the improvement of 
their socio-economic situation. But this has been largely 
disappointing, thus, the people’s willingness to use 
violence to achieve what they want has been further 
strengthened.
The increased supply of potentially militant actors 
with weapons is one of the crucial factors for the increase 
in violent struggle since the end of the 1990s. The illegal 
circulation of weapons is not just by the corrupt and 
greedy intentions of national politicians and security 
forces; it also has international dimensions. To Hazen 
& Horner (2007: 25, 91), “estimates regarding the 
proliferation of weapons in Nigeria assume the presence 
of one to three million small arms, majority of them 
unlicensed and therefore illegal…” Similarly, “community 
armouries now appear to be a common phenomenon in 
the Delta”.
To some extent, the prevalence of these weapons can 
be traced back to the Biafra War; while majority of others 
were imported into the country. The main external sources 
are said to be “the neighbouring countries, many of 
which had experienced violent conflicts” (Human Rights 
Watch 2003: 25). The weapons are brought to Nigeria by 
Nigerian or foreign arms dealers through the country’s 
very porous frontiers. Particularly important entry points 
appear to be “the borders with Togo and Benin” (Hazen 
& Horner, 2007: 34). In Nigeria the weapons are sold 
directly to the militants, the security forces, governmental 
agencies, and business people who then pass them on. 
Weapons also enter the country illegally, albeit to a lesser 
extent, “through Nigerian soldiers that returned from 
ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone” (AI, 
2005: 36).
In sum, what is clear from the discourse on both 
the immediate and remote essences of the violence in 
the Niger Delta above are first, whereas, the immediate 
causal factors are dominantly violence that arose as 
result of oil factor, the remote factors on the other hand, 
are violence that arose as result of weaknesses inherent 
in Nigeria’s political institutions and environment. 
Secondly, combinations of the negative impacts of both 
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the immediate and remote factors among others combined 
to exacerbate and escalate the violence in the Niger Delta. 
Given the above analysis therefore, the immediate factors 
(oil issues) could be said, are not the only factors that 
decisively explain the essence of violence in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta as the rentier state theory and the resource-
curse thesis appear to suggest. But rather, the remote 
factors, that is, the all the more important weaknesses 
inherent in Nigeria’s political institutions and environment 
have lately overridden the oil factor motives as the 
essences of violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article examined the relevance of the rentier state 
theory and the resource-curse thesis to explain the essence 
of the oil resource violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta that 
has escalated since the second half of the 1990s. On the 
basis of the discourse, it became clear especially with 
reference to the immediate causal factors (oil issues) 
that, the people of the oil producing states are aggrieved 
and thus resort to violence, and perhaps armed struggle 
because, the politics of oil revenue allocation have been 
unfavourable, while at the same time, they are negatively 
affected by the disastrous ecological and social impacts of 
oil production. Furthermore, the people of the Niger Delta 
resort to violent struggle as they are aggrieved about the 
prevalence of negative socio-economic conditions such 
as unemployment, corruption, absence of infrastructural 
developments among others.
Following the discourse of the immediate factors, 
the remote factors were also critically analysed, and it 
was noted that the violent conflict in the Niger Delta 
is traceable to weaknesses of the Nigerian political 
institutions and environment. For example, weak political 
institutions and corruption has provided the structural 
basis for the broad involvement of various groups in oil 
bunkering and trade in weapons. Similarly, assisted by 
international actors, who are earning significant profits 
from the illegal trade, oil bunkering became widespread 
and an opportunity to eat from the national cake. Thus, 
because of greed, all the parties involved in the illegal 
trade are therefore not interested in the end to the violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta. 
In sum therefore, what one can deduce from the 
foregoing discourse is that, in consonance with the 
assumptions of the rentier state theory of the state and 
the resource-curse thesis, a combination of the immediate 
causal factors, which are predominantly oil oriented 
grievances are the initial motives for the violent conflict 
in the Niger Delta. However, on the basis of the discourse, 
it became clear that, these initial motives alone are not 
sufficient to exhaustively explain the essence of the 
violence in the Niger Delta. This is because; significant, 
but remote causal factors are also relevant to explaining 
the recurring violent conflict. It is on this note it became 
obvious that, the negative impacts of both the immediate 
and remote factors among others combined to escalate the 
violence.
In conclusion, given the analysis in this article, there is 
no doubting the utility of the rentier state theory and the 
resource-curse approaches to explaining the essence of 
the violent conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Even though 
the approaches have or are expected to be universally 
valid, nevertheless, their potential to exhaustively explain 
the essence of the escalating violence in the Niger Delta, 
depend decisively on other salient factors. Therefore, 
the limitation in the assumptions of these approaches are 
by implication, a suggestion of the necessity to revise 
the embedded assumptions, as some salient factors 
which were over-looked by these established theoretical 
approaches are considered germane to explaining the 
essence of an equivalent of Nigeria’s own version of the 
“new war” that is spreading across the length and breath 
of the world.
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